We present two schemata with which to parse cases of genocide and mass killings (GMK) 
INTRODUCTION
The word genocide was coined in print in 1944 (Lemkin, 1944) The second schema, by Brauer and Anderton (2014) , takes one economic theory-constrained optimization theory (COT)-and illustratively applies it in Section 3 to pre-Holocaust examples. This is an elaboration of Anderton's (2014) first interdependency-genocide as a deliberate choice made as against feasible nongenocidal alternatives. The general idea is that perpetrators, victims, and third parties (internal and external bystanders) each have specific objectives (respectively, to victimize, to escape victimization, and whether to intervene or not) and that the feasible alternatives from which each chooses one specific course of action are constrained by a limited pool of resources available to pay the cost of the action (victimization, escape, or intervention). For perpetrators, victims, and third parties, respectively, Tables A1A, A1B, and A1C in the Appendix are abstracted from Brauer and Anderton (2014) . They lay out in some detail who forms preferences (objectives) over genocide (or escape or intervention) , what these preferences entail, and why, when, where, and how they are formed. The tables also lay out detailed, but not case-specific, ideas in regard to the monetary and nonmonetary resources available to pay the monetary and nonmonetary costs of perpetrating, escaping, or intervening in genocide. They also make points in regard to factors that may enhance the productivity of conducting, escaping, or intervening in genocide.
TABLES A1A, A1B, A1C ABOUT HERE
Again, the hope is twofold. We hope that genocide scholars will appreciate the illustrative re-reading of pre-Holocaust cases in light of the idea that specific genocidal choices made are the direct outcome of resource and cost constraints and that, had the constraints been less binding (for perpetrators, victims, or potential interveners), a non-genocidal choice may well have been made. Re-reading genocide history through the lens of optimization given monetary and nonmonetary resource and cost constraints may help to more deeply or, at any rate, differently understand GMK cases. Likewise, for economists, the illustrative applications of COT in this chapter may encourage them to more deeply delve into particular aspects of genocide decisionmaking, not just in post-Holocaust cases as the literature already does but also in pre-Holocaust cases and thus deepen the theoretical and empirical basis of applying (one) economic theory to a larger set of cases of GMK. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
KEY INTERDEPENDENCIES
Genocidal conflict as a deliberate choice. Genocide rarely appears as a fully formed choice. Typically, it is preceded by a number of signposts. In a famous briefing paper prepared for U.S. government officials, Gregory Stanton (1996) For example, the Yana were a population of some 3,000 Native Americans, living at the northern end of California's Central Valley. Their eventual extermination was perfect in the sense that at the beginning of the twentieth century only one Yana survivor was reported to be alive and the group's reproduction therefore no longer possible (also see, e.g., Kugler, ch. 11, ch. 12, in this 6 volume) . According to the case author, Ben Madley, in the wake of the Californian gold rush from the late 1840s to the 1880s, the "motives driving immigrants to destroy the Yana changed over time, as did the organization of their killing operations" (p. 18). In the end, however, the initial colonizers as well as later immigrants wanted to establish an "Indian-free environment" (p. 24) to appropriate land-based natural resources for "ranching, hunting, and mining" (p. 22). On occasion, their purpose might have appeared to be defensive and retaliatory because of Indian raids against settlers but, in time, the goal became Yana elimination for its own sake. This was government tolerated and government co-financed. For instance, in support of the state's first civilian governor, Peter H. Burnett, who declared that "a war of extermination will continue to be waged … until the Indian race becomes extinct" (p. 20)-and one can hardly be clearer about the deliberateness of the intent and the genocidal choice made-California's legislators appropriated US$500,000 and US$600,000 dollars in 1851 and 1852, respectively, to fund state-sanctioned Indian-hunting campaigns staffed by militia volunteers. This gained momentum in 1858-1859 when colonizers bent on institutionalized killings received support from then-Governor John B. Weller. Again, a state-supported militia, led by Adjutant General William C. Kibbe, was created. Money was raised to hire men literally to hunt Indians. Kibbe claimed the sum of US$69,486 for the expedition. Indian-hunters were compensated with an amount of cash paid per Indian scalp. The incentive structure proved important and personal greed partly motivated and reinforced the campaign against the Yana. "Ultimately," writes Madley, "the drive to destroy the Yana became an ideology of total annihilation" (p.
44). The choice no longer was merely to confiscate Indian-held resources or to enslave Indians as laborers. The choice made was to kill to the point of group extermination. Section 3 elaborates on the cost and resource constraints that shaped this, and other genocide, choices. That genocide becomes a choice is no longer in dispute among genocide scholars. But the conditions that help shape the making of this choice are perhaps less-well clearly examined and understood.
Section 3 addresses this issue in more detail as do a number of more technical and formal chapters in this book, including Anderton and Brauer (2015) .
Economic conditions affecting genocidal conflict. Between 1904 and 1907 imperial Germany waged a war against the Herero population that had revolted against colonial rule in German South-West Africa (now Namibia). The chapter author in Totten and Parsons (2013) , Dominik Schaller, writes that initially aimed solely against Herero, the war eventually embroiled Nama people as well. The latter, after at first supporting the settlers, began guerrilla operations against the German army because of a growing fear that commander's Lothar von Trotta's racist and explicit extermination policy would be applied to Nama as well as to Herero (p. 90) . By the end of the war about 60,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama had died (p. 90). Long before the German-Herero war and subsequent genocide commenced, colonists had been "waiting for the elimination of the Africans as autonomous actors [ but] were well aware that their military power and colonial infrastructure had not been sufficient. Therefore, settlers were afraid that a major African uprising could hamper the positive political and economic development in the colony" (pp. 90-91). Uprisings did happen, with the one on 12 January 1904 generally cited as the beginning of war between Herero and the about 5,000
Germans, English, and Boer colonists (p. 94).
At the turn of the century, Herero numbered about 80,000 people in Central Namibia. Traditionally pastoralists, by the mid-1800s they had become the region's predominant cattle herders, breeders, and traders. The Nama, numbering about 20,000, lived mostly in South Namibia. Also a cattle-people, they traded mostly with the Cape Colony further to the south. Northern Namibia, not much accessed by Seeking to effect a far-reaching elimination of minorities, guarantee itself full control of territory, and to confiscate Armenian properties, the state built up a secret police of 40,000 people. Details are provided in Section 3 but, in brief, many agencies and ministries of the Ottoman state were involved in the implementation of the genocide. A secret agency (the "Special Organization"), committed to mass murder, was created. The extermination plan involved, in large part, forced deportations to Syria and Mesopotamia which, by design, then reduced to a simple process: Escorted columns of deportees, mostly women, children, the elderly, and infirm, were decimated through robbery, exposure, privation, starvation, or direct attack, on their way to, or in, the Syrian desert. Illustration 4 in Section 3 will expand on this, especially in regard to how the availability of Ottoman resources helped shape the specific form that the genocide took.
Genocide as wealth appropriation. Stalin's manufactured famine in east-central Ukraine and the North Caucasus in 1932/3 resulted in perhaps 5 to 7 million victims. At the time, the Great Depression badly affected the economies of the entire world. James Mace, author of the Ukraine chapter in Totten and Parsons (2013), writes that the USSR "seized with unprecedented force and thoroughness the 1932 crop and food-stuffs from the agricultural population" (p. 157). Ukrainian farms were forcibly collectivized, food production first requisitioned, then simply confiscated and siphoned off. But wealth appropriation goes beyond Lemkin's narrowly-understood economic "field," such as "including forced impoverishment, expelling people from businesses and occupations, manipulations of trade and finance, appropriation of assets and enslavement" (Anderton, 2014, p. 125) . Wealth appropriation in a broader sense refers to the taking of any and all resources at the victims' disposal, economic or otherwise, and thus covers all of Lemkin's eight domains over which genocide is carried out (the political, social, cultural, [narrowly] economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral fields). For example, Ukrainian victims, mostly a peasantry, had an "incomplete social structure, [lacked their] own ruling class," and had no independent political clout (p. 158). As for others in imperial Russia, Ukrainians social and cultural assets already had been severely challenged (p. 158). With the collapse of the empire, in 1917, Russia's new leaders sought to unify the country under the ideological banner of a progressive urban proletariat to be set against rural, traditionalist interests. A new consciousness was to be established, neither Russian nor Ukrainian, but based on a self-understanding as an international proletariat united against exploitative capitalists. The rural and urban proletariat of the various nations of the USSR were to unite against landowning rentiers. In a way, all peoples, and the wealth inherent in their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and other forms of diversity, were to be appropriated and abolished as separately recognizable entities and cultures. They were to be reborn program of forced collectivization of agriculture and pursued a push toward urbanbased industrialization (the Revolution from Above). This required an increasingly simplified ideology wherein a stubborn petty bourgeois class of landowners (the kulaks) was said to exploit other types of farm-workers and accused of withholding food supplies from the remainder of the USSR, and combined with Stalin's definition of a nation: "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture ... It must be emphasized that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation." 1 This definition proved to be the basis for eliminating non-Russian national identities. Wealth appropriation in this broad sense-as the total appropriation of any and all resources that give rise to sustainable cultures, economies, and polities-is astonishingly far-reaching.
Appropriation also is an eminently economic topic.
Genocide as deprivation of security as a fundamental service. Alongside health and education, the physical security of one's property, person, family, and community is fundamental to a well-ordered society. Depriving a people of the protection of the law and giving immunity to perpetrators-or even to incentivize them-creates insecurity. For example, under Stalin an internal passport system was introduced that limited people's freedom of movement. Escape routes were blocked. In Australia, permission for leave government created Aborigines reserves needed to be sought from the colonial authorities, usually to work on cattle stations but without any labor rights, not even to the legal minimum wage. Legally defined as "under legal guardianship, wards of the state, minors in law, specifically denied civil rights, social welfare entitlements, and most of the benefits inherent and explicit in the rule of law" (p. 64), Aborigines neither could marry nor legally engage in sexual intercourse with non-Aborigines. Nor could they vote in state or federal elections until the 1960s. The point was seclusion, privation, and-with the removal of their children-genocide (pp. 64-65). The Yana, in California, had no protection of their property or their lives under the law and the literal hunting of Yana was financially incentivized by the governments of California and the federal government of the United States. The Herero and Nama, in South-West Africa, "were dispossessed and all their land was officially seized by the colonial power … All Africans were compelled to compulsory work" and colonial decrees "restricted the Africans' freedom of movement gravely and forced them to carry a tiny identity badge around the neck" (p. 96). In Ottoman Turkey, the state was "withholding from [Armenians] the protection of the state" (p. 119). The examples can be multiplied at will. Under conditions of pervasive insecurity, a part of the work force is converted from an economic asset to an economic liability as their productivity and economic contribution to the country is reduced. This necessarily is a topic for economics and economists.
In sum, even a cursory reading of the pre-Holocaust literature easily yields ample illustrations for each of Anderton's (2014) claimed "interdependencies" between economics and genocide. His contention that economic considerations may offer valuable additional insights into the process of genocide seems quite on the mark and may well be worth pursuing in greater detail in separate research efforts.
CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION THEORY
An example of a formal (i.e., mathematics-based) application of constrained optimization theory (COT) to cases of genocide and mass killings (GMK) is provided in Anderton and Brauer (2015) . The theory makes specific predictions and raises specific policy issues for would-be interveners to consider. A nonformal statement of COT is developed in Brauer and Anderton (2014) for which this section in this chapter provides several case illustrations drawn from the pre-Holocaust era. In short, the hardly disputable idea is that to achieve a desired end, even that of genocide, perpetrators necessarily must avail themselves of resources to pay the cost of achieving their objective. Genocide requires a set of actions and these actions incur costs to be defrayed from a pool of resources. Logically, there are two dimensions to thinking about genocide in terms of COT: If the general objective is simply the removal of an undesired out-group, then their killing as a specific act is but one among a number of alternative options to achieve the general objective. For example, the relocation of the out-group to territories of other states is, in principle, an alternative option. But even if killing itself is the objective, it would still be true that different forms of killing (shooting, gassing, starving, and so on) impose different draws on the perpetrators' resource base. In either case, it is a safe presumption that perpetrators are not as wasteful with their resources as they are with their intended victims' lives. The theory thus predicts that as cost and resource constraints-or changes in cost and resource constraints-become binding, they seemingly force the hand of perpetrators as if to direct them, given a specific objective they wish to achieve, into one form of genocide rather than another.
Perpetrators are hypothesized to attempt to "optimize" the destruction, subject to cost and resource constraints. (Of course, the objective itself can change as well.)
COT does not justify perpetrators' objectives. The point is not to understand the beliefs upon which perpetrators act. Instead, the intent is to understand the calculus of the act itself and of how (changes in) cost and resource constraints influence the act about to be undertaken. Note that COT reasoning also applies to victims who attempt to escape victimization as well as to potential third-party interveners since they, too, act under cost and resource constraints. One conclusion from the COT perspective is that genocide, and mass killings more generally, may be viewed, analytically, as a life-or-death contest over costs and the resources to defray them. If the cost is too high or the resource base too small, perpetrators may remain hateful but have no means to act on their beliefs, however come by.
Likewise, if the cost is too high or the resource base too small, victims cannot hope to escape victimization and third parties cannot intervene, whatever else they may feel, think, or say, in private or in public. Also note that costs and resources include nonmonetary costs and resources and include the entire panoply of feelings, perceptions, images, and attitudes on the basis of which humans form, maintain, or change the objectives they wish to pursue (see Illustration 2 below; also see Boulding, 1956; Stigler and Becker, 1977) . In an action-reaction pattern, or so Madley describes the sequence of events, settlers responded in kind, raiding Indian camps in turn. Their numbers, firepower, recourse to state financing (and, later, to federal financing, p. 32), as well as immunity from the law for abusing or killing Indians, overwhelmed the Yana.
During one of General Kibbe's Indian-hunting campaigns, he endeavored to keep
Yana on the run, hemmed them in certain locations to deny them opportunity and time "to gather acorns or seeds sufficient for winter, or to fish." He thus prepared them for death by starvation lest they surrendered to accept forced relocation onto reservations, "an agonizing choice" (p. 31)-again precisely the point COT makes.
True, fleeing ever further from familiar hunting, harvesting, and fishing grounds and abandoning camps and food stores did imply that the Yana had increasingly "little to lose" (p. 35), but they also had even less to fight with to effectively oppose their own destruction. Madley rightly points out that "the state of California, the U.S. government, or immigrant communities could have negotiated with the Yana and avoided genocide" and that "diplomacy might have generated a very different outcome" (p. 45). But by then both the mind set and the incentive structure (e.g., In a third phase, following the war itself, captives were released into a political, economic, and cultural vacuum. The colonial authorities instituted a policy of tribal de-identification and proletarian re-identification was pursued, a cultural genocide and repurposing of human beings for economic exploitation. In a 1907 decree, freedom of movement was severely restricted for indigenous peoples and the wearing of identity tags made mandatory. Additionally, settlers demanded that all indigenous peoples be tattooed (p. 96). Still fearing uprisings, a deportation policy was considered to ship victims to the then-German colonies of Cameroon and Papua New Guinea but the outbreak of world war one prevented its large-scale implementation (p. 96).
Illustration 4 (Armenians):
The fourth illustration focuses on the resources a perpetrator can bring to bear on the victims. As mentioned, the Ottoman empire "withdrew the protection of the state" from Armenian subjects: Its cabinet made the decisions, charged its Ministries of the Interior and of War with overseeing the destruction, and they in turn "instructed local authorities on procedure, the timing of deportation, and the routing of the convoys of exiles" (p. 126). Parliament "enacted legislation legalizing the decisions of the cabinet" (p. 126). The Turkish leaders had "at their disposal immense resources of power and an arsenal of formal and informal instruments of coercion" (p. 118). And "at every level of the operation against the Armenians, party [i.e., CUP] functionaries relayed, received, and enforced the orders of the government" (p. 119). The primary prong of attack consisted of deportation orders, implemented by removal by train, or by horsedrawn wagon, by mules, or-for most victims-by walking southeast from the Anatolian plain or either south from the Black Sea or southwest from Armenia, both mountainous regions, toward the Syrian desert. The government made "no provisions" to supply food or overnight shelter and "only one-quarter of all deportees survived the hundreds of miles and weeks of walking" (p. 120). Local governments assisted in the deliberate neglect. Marauders, including Kurds (another, but Muslim, minority), preyed on refugee caravans, looting, raping, kidnapping, and killing without penalty. Those who survived all the way to Syria died there from the day's heat or night's cold or were assaulted by "sword and bayonet" by the Special Organization's killing units (p. 120). Rouben Adalian, the author of the Armenia chapter in Totten and Parsons (2013), writes that the "deportations were not intended to be an orderly relocation process" (p. 120). Our alternative reading says that the genocide was in fact highly orderly in that government provided for the underlying structure which was "conceived with secrecy and deliberation and Armenians' "abandoned goods" were confiscated and auctioned off, profiting CUP officials and as a "means that rewarded its supporters" (p. 127). Still, set against the resources of the Ottoman state as a whole, neither Armenians themselves nor third parties-embroiled as they were in world war one-could or did offer any effective counter-force. (Little is mentioned of their resources, either, but both faults are rectified to some degree in the 20 pages of eyewitness accounts appended to the chapter.) But from the actions of the perpetrators one can infer a few things about the potential cost of attempting escape. The Ukrainian victims were primarily rural populations with an underdeveloped class of intellectuals who might have articulated the experiences, feelings, and thoughts of their compatriots. The famine "corresponded in time with a reversal of official policies that had hitherto permitted significant self-expression of the USSR's non-Russian nations." Now, "non-Russian national self-assertion was labeled bourgeois nationalism and suppressed" (p. 157). Freedom of movement was eventually curtailed with the introduction of an internal passport system (pp. 166, 172) . Forced collectivization of farms was introduced, using as enforcers city-based workers who were notionally integrated into national, pan-Soviet aspirations.
"Workers were sent from factories, and sometimes a factory would be named 'patron' of a given number of villages; that is, the factory would be assigned villages in which to enforce collectivization and seize foods" (pp. 162-163) . Accompanied by State Political Directorate (GPU) forces and hunting dogs, these "tow brigades" would harass, manhandle, torture, and kill peasants in order to search for, find, and confiscate food. Horses, tools, and farm implements were removed as well (p. 175).
With neither passports, transport, or food, and with close supervision of their activities, escape was beyond reach. To successfully run away or obtain forged papers to travel (p. 171) appear exceptional events. Peasants whose farms had not yet been collectivized nonetheless were subject to deliver food quotas.
Nonfulfillment meant fines and searches of their farms (p. 163). Children were encouraged to turn on their parents and report suspected hoarding of food or seeds (p. 167). Bits of precious metals and jewelry in peasant possession were extracted in exchange for food at an increasing number of state-operated hard currency stores (pp. 166, 173) . Eyewitness accounts report acts of cannibalism by starving peasants to ensure physical survival (e.g., pp. 172/3, 186) . Starvation greatly increased vulnerability to disease and a great many people died of typhus, dysentery, and the like. Demoralization added weight to the psychological cost of dealing with loss of lives and property. One eyewitness, then a school child, recalls a Russian-language song that in the heyday of starvation "would play every day, ten times a day" over the ubiquitous village loudspeakers heralding the "joyous refrain of town and country: Our burdens have lightened, our lives have gladdened" (p. 184). Resistance met with virtually immediate reprisal by state security forces (e.g., p. 172). While confiscated food stuffs were exported to elsewhere in the USSR, migration was prohibited and offers of food aid (imports) were rejected, matching the official denial of a food crisis or widespread starvation. As Steven Rosefielde (2009) Victimhood might be defined by the degree to which cost and resource constraints are binding and foreclose option to escape victimization.
CONCLUSION
Much of the literature covers the Holocaust and post-Holocaust cases, and because of that this chapter has focused on pre-Holocaust genocides. Given its universal claims, if economic theory is relevant post-1940s genocides, it should be relevant pre-1940s genocides. Using a six-fold schema elaborated by Anderton (2014) and applying it in Section 2 even cursorily to the cases of the Yana, Aborigines, Herero and Nama, Armenians, and Ukrainians, we find that all of Anderton's contentions as to the relevance and potential contribution of economics to help understand genocide more fully appear correct. A more specific investigation, in Section 3, focusing only on genocide as a behavior of choice, likewise reveals that the economic concept of meeting objectives ("preferences") under cost and resource constraints is highly relevant and can be illustrated with ease for each of the pre-Holocaust cases that this chapter has, however briefly, examined.
To conclude, we offer eight impressions from our reading of the cases through an economic lens. The first is that the case study writers predominantly seem interested in questions of guilt and of justice. Documentation focuses on perpetrators' objectives-however distorted and malevolent-and on the mechanics of how and why the atrocities were committed rather than on how and why they were carried out in one specific way rather than another. As a whole, the chapters rarely directly consider any genocidal act, or escape therefrom, as the outcome of constraints imposed by costs and resources. Authors tend to take feasibility as given and emphasis is placed on a particular choice made, a behavior observed, and not on what the alternatives, if any, were, or on how any one choice came to be made. This overstates things for the sake of argument, but an important implication is that one cannot hope to improve the score on genocide prevention unless one more fully understands the constraints that may divide acts of genocide into feasible and Just how did survivors survive? It is not clear to us that genocide survivor stories have been systematically parsed, and compared, to come to a theory-driven and/or theory-creating general understanding of why survival occurs, so that survivors' experiences may be used to better assist future victims and limit the damage done.
Third, in many of the cases, third parties appear somewhat incidental. In all five cases, there was no lack of information about a genocide happening: The German settler's knew and just wanted to changes its course, as did "well-meaning" people in Australia. In the Armenian case, the news was widespread throughout the world.
But the relative capacity or incapacity of potential interveners appears not well theoretized or explored and economists might well make helpful contributions in this regard.
Fourth, regarding preferences, costs, and resources, the cases pay most attention to the former, and mostly to those of perpetrators. But one other theme does emerge strongly, namely, depriving victims of food sources and compelling them to deal with sheer day-to-day physical survival. Herero and Armenians were driven into deserts, Ukrainians dispossessed of farm produce, and Yana chased into food-scarce mountain regions. While probably beyond the logistical capacity of the world at the time, today this suggests that a Convention be sought with built-in triggers (thresholds) which, when tripped, precipitate automatic food aid delivery from UN depots by UN forces (also see ch. 7 in this volume).
Beyond perpetrators, victims, and third parties and beyond preferences, costs, and resources, are other observations. From our reading it would appear, fifth, that among victims a spontaneous separation takes place. Victims are not all equal; some have better opportunities than others. Diasporas seem self-selected, for example, in that the relative geographic openness of a genocide-perpetrating country matters. When victims can flee with relative ease to neighboring countries-some Nama south to the Cape Colony, some Armenians north into Russia-then those living near a border will generally have an easier time to escape than those bottled up in the country's interior. Their cost is lower; their opportunity set is enlarged, exactly as argued theoretically in Brauer and Anderton (2014) . In contrast, when one border is more heavily guarded or sealed, then a cross country journey to another border becomes all the more hazardous, as illustrated by Herero trying to cross the desert. This seems too obvious to state but in the cases we read we see little exploration of such themes, nor how they may be exploited to mitigate genocide.
Sixth, in regard to the productivity with which acts of genocide and mass killings are carried out, economies of scale and density are important. For the case of the Yana, scale was not as relevant. Living in small bands, being relatively mobile, and knowing their own lands better than the pursuers, killing took place one "batch" at a time. In contrast, concentrated columns of Armenians marching in the open were far easier to attack. Also decisive in facilitating the killing is, seventh, the relative speed with which victims and perpetrators can act. Speed depends on transport, communication, and bureaucratic or organizational coordination. The set of feasible options for victims can become extremely narrow because of timing. For the Yana, the genocide wore on for decades and for the Aborigines for about two centuries. The economic issue here was neither time nor agglomeration but, to the contrary, the dispersed nature of the victims, albeit within well-defined boundaries, combined with information and network economies. In the cases of Armenia and Ukraine, the killing proceeded fast, in part because perpetrators could coordinate their actions far more easily than victims could organize their escape (several chapters in this book address aspects of genocide from the point of view of organization). That genocide can be both fast and slow should surprise, highlighting once more that genocide is conditional, that it stands or falls on its feasibility.
Eighth, the economics of image (perceptions) and identity (preferences) is highly relevant to genocide and genocide studies (Boulding, 1956; Akerlof and Kranton, 2011) : The relative ease of (self)identification and (self)labeling of victims facilitates genocide. The potentially strong call for the development of a supervening identity ("we, all of us," our "common humanity") is generally not explored in the cases. If such calls were made, why were they not heeded? Neither perpetrators, victims, nor 28 third parties are unitary actors. Each of "us" and each of "them" lives by constraints, impelling each to action or inaction. What combination of strength of conviction (preferences), cost, and resources procures one outcome over another?
Unless one explores this nexus, one must conclude-probably incorrectly-that for the victims there exists no exit.
There are other themes in, and tools of, economics that could be helpful to the study and prevention of genocide. One thinks for example of (evolutionary) game theory and of behavioral economics, both applied elsewhere in this book, such as public good coordination failure in game theoretic setups or identifying and studying the conditions that shape the anticipatory, strategic behavior of perpetrators, victims, and third-parties, or topics such as framing, cognitive bias, and reference-point dependence in behavioral economics. Even our brief excursion demonstrates that economists can no longer stay away from making the contribution their science affords them to make to the study of genocide, mass killings, and their prevention.
